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Article 7

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
BANKS AND BANKING-Chanpion v. Big Stone County Bank,
et al, 224 N. W. (Minn.) 258, 1929. The plaintiff, as treasurer
of the village of Graceville, deposited with the Big Stone County
Bank a sum of $16,000 which had been obtained from the sale of
bonds and which was to be used for the purpose of constructing a
village well and for the construction of streets. The fund was deposited with the bank by the treasurer, at direction of the town
council, in an account.designated as "Village of Graceville Street
and Well Fund." The village instructed the bank that no part
of the fund was to be used for any purpose other than that
designated. Subsequently the bank became insolvent and the
defendant, Veigel, took possession of the assets for liquidation.
The plaintiff brought this action to recover $2,088.30, which, was
the amount of the fund remaining in the bank at the time it
became insolvent, alleging that this was a preferred claim against
the assets of the bank. The plaintiff had judgment in the trial
court but on appeal this judgment was overruled, the court
stating that there was no fiduciary relationship between the
bank and the plaintiff. The bank had no special duty in respect
to this fuid other than to restrict payments from it to the specific
purpose for which it was created. -Such a duty did not create
the relationship of bailor and bailee, but of debtor and creditor;
therefore the plaintiff had no right to a superior claim over the
other creditors of the bank.
BRIBERY-Giving money to village police officer to refrain from instituting criminal proceeding in Federal court for
violation of the National Prohibition Act for selling liquor held
to constitute offense of bribing public officer.
In the recent case of People v. Lafaro (New York) 165 N. E.
518, the defendant, Lafaro, owned and operated a public billiard
room in the village of Waverly where he sold intoxicating liquor.
The village chief of police visited the premises and found somewhiskey. The next morning the defendant went to the office
of the chief of police and gave him twenty dollars. According
to the testimony of the chief of police, defendant offered to pay
him the further sum of twenty dollars every month. At the
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trial, the defendant was convicted and the Appellate Division
affirmed the conviction on appeal. From that decision the defendant appeals to the Court of Appeals for a reversal.
The defendant's chief contention on appeal was that the
payment of money as charged in the indictment was not made
with the intent to influence the police officer in respect to any
act in the exercise of his powers or functions as an officer of the
state and therefore that the statute concerning the bribery of
public officers was not violated by him and his conviction could
not stand. The question is, whether, complaint to the federal
authorities of a violation discovered by the officer in the course
of his duty is not part of the function of a state police officer.
at least where the continued violation tends to affect the health,
morals and good order of the public.
In answer to this question the court said: "The gist of the
crime of bribery is the wrong done to the People by corruption
in the public service. None can doubt that this defendant sought
corruptly to influence a public officer, in the performance of an
act which, it is evident, the defendant, the police officer and the
Governor of the state considered a public duty owed by a public
servant. We have given to the statutory definition of bribery a
construction broad enough to cover cases where a public officer
has accepted a bribe to act corruptly in a matter beyond his official powers or duties. People v. Jackson, 191 N. Y. 293; 15
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1173; People v. Clougher 246 N. Y: 106, 158
N. E. 38."
The court further went on: "Duties and functions of police
officers have never been limited rigidly to the field of law enforcement in which police officers exercise special powers and
enjoy special immunities. Police officers are the guardians of
public peace, but the public is accustomed to look upon them
also as guardians of the comfort, safety, and good order of the
locality against dangers arising from other causes than offenses
against the peace and dignity of the state. No line of demarcation can be drawn definitely .......
..
In matters germane
to the official functions of police officers, there may be a wide
scope for the exercise of discretion as to the form and range
of services to be rendered; but it can hardly be doubted seriously
that a police officer might be directed by his official superior to
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report violations.of a federal statute to federal authorities and
that failure to carry out such directions would be an official
dereliction."
The defendant further -contended that while traffic with a
public officer of the state in the privilege or duty of invoking the
public justice of thoe state constitutes the crime of bribery, traffic
with such a public officer in the privilege o rduty of invoking the
public justice of the nation does not. The court'said in answer
to this: "Such distinctions have no place in the administration
of the criminal law. We refuse to read them into the statute
At times the violation of. the Federal Prohibition law may constitute an offense also under the law of the state. See People
v. Van DeWater 250 N. Y. 83. In the.present case the defendant's sale of intoxicating liquor in a billiaTd room constituted
an offense against both the state and the nation. Clearly under
such circumstances, a decision to institute proceedings in the
Federal court to end an act which disturbs the peace and order of
the community cannot be said to be wholly outside the functions
of the police officer. Even where the act which violates the
Federal statute is not a violation of any law of the state, in a
broad sense, the public peace and order miay yet be disturbed by
violation of any law, regardless of its source."
*
In the final paragraph of the court's olinion it strongly
urged co-operation between federal and state governments
which shows the- reasoning behind the court's entire opinion.
The court stated as follows:: "If enforcement of state law is
confided solely to the public officers of the state, and the enforcement of the federal law is confided solely to the public officers of the United States, then in the interests of the community there may well be co-operation between the two. At least.
we may say that such co-operation in the interests of the public
is not outside the functions of officers to whom law enforcement has been confided. Otherwise the complications inherent
in our system of dual sovereignty would become intolerable.
Bribes offered to police officers to refrain from co-operation with
federal authorities must bring corruption into our police force.
We will not impute to the legislature any intention that narrow
distinctions should be drawn between traffic with a public officer affecting the peace, order and justice of the state and the'
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traffic with the same officer affecting the peace, order and justice of the United States where the purpose and natural effect
of the act is to corrupt the police of the state." judgment
affirmed.
I. S. Angelino.
CARRIERS AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONSGilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 48 Supreme Court
Reporter 282, is an appeal from the District Court (Southern
District) of New York which authorized an interlocutory injunction to restrain the appellants, the Transit Commission and
New Ybrk City, from forcing on the appellee the acceptance' of a
five cent fare on the lines operated by it.
The contention of the appellee is that the five cent fare
originally stipulated and long observed had become non-compensatory and that under the Public Service Law of 1907, directing reasonable rates, they should be allowed an increase in fare.
The Transit Commission insisted on observance of the five cent
rate and the appellee insists that this amounted to action by
the state which would deprive the Interborough Company of
property without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In 1891 the legislature of New York passed the Rapid
Transit Act which provided for a board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners who were to have the power to contract for
the construction of Rapid Transit lines and for the fare to be
charged. The present rapid transit lines in New York are the
result of this act.
In 1907 the Public Service Commission Law was passed to
provide for the regulation and control of Public Service Corporations. In May, 1920, the Interborough Company, purporting to
proceed under the Public Service Commission Law, complained
to the Commission that a five cent fare was insufficient. Relief
was denied because of no jurisdiction on the part of the Commission to fix a rate different from that fixed by the contract as
made under the Rapid Transit Act.
In 1928 the Interborough Compan r, adopting the method
prescribed by the Public Service Law, filed with the Commission
new schedules that purported to establish a seven cent fare. No
action was taken by the Commission but it appears that counsel
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for the Commission and the Mayor expressed opinion that no
relief should be granted. The next action taken by the Transit
Company was to file a bill asking for an injunction against the
Commission, so that there would 'be no interference with the
establishment of a,seven cent fare.
o The first question to be decided was concerning the right
of the Transit Company to resort to the Federal Court for ,an
injunction before the statutory period had run after the filing
of its application for a new rate. On this point the court held
that the Transit Company was without authority to file its suit
for'injunction before the expiration of the thirty days as allowed
by statute even though the Commission had prior thereto expressed the opinion that it lacked the jurisdiction to -permit the
new rate, because of the existing contract entered into under the
Rapid Transit Act.
Mr. Justice McReynolds in his opinion said that the ruling
was -put on the single ground that the franchise contract was
subject to the statute and by the statute may be changed. This
is under the doctrine approved in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line.
211 U. S. 210.
The court also said that considering the probable fair value
of the subways and the current receipts therefrom no adequate
basis is shown for claiming that the five cent rate is confiscatory.
The interlocutory order was reversed and the cause remanded
to the District Court for further proceedings in conformity with
the Supreme Court's opinion.
Marc Wonderlin.
CENSORS--Right to Censor Movietone.
In Re Fox Film Corporation, 145 A. 515.
*ULder an act of May 15, 1915 (Pa. St. 1920-sec..21120 et
seq.) all motion picture film, before being exhibited, must be approved by the Pennsylvania state board of censors. This board
of censors, in conformity with the right conferred -upon it by the
said act, required all films submitted which were to be exhibited
in conjunction with any mechanical device for the -utterance of
language, to *be submitted to the board together with such
language.
The film company refused to do this on the ground that
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such a requirement was beyond the authority of the board of
censors. The board on its behalf alleged that without a knowledge of the language proposed to be uttered in connection with
the picture, it would be unable to determine whether or not
the film was moral or improper, as was required of them by the
said act.
The court held that movietone, viewed from a commonsense standpoint, is the recordation of spoken language upon a
film and constitutes merely a recordation differing in matter
and kind from that on a silent film, and designed to reach the
hearing of the audiences instead of its sight or vision. It is thus
only an incidental variant style or kind of film and therefore
comes within the,scope of the meaning and application of the
term "film" as used in the act of 1915 (supra) which therefore
gives the board the power to require that such language be submitted together with the film to the board of censors.
W. S. McCray.
CRIMINAL LAW.-Search of defendant's room without
warrant, during her absence and without her consent was unlawful. Admission into evidence of property found there was
error.
Confession obtained under promise that it would inure to
defendant's benefit at trial held incompetent.
People v. Stokes. Supreme Court of Illinois, Feb. 20, 1929.
165. N. E. 611. This was an appeal from a conviction of manslaughter. Affirmed.
Florence Stokes had been keeping company with James
Glennon from October, 1924 until the night of his decease, Feb.
27, 1927. They had had illicit relations on several occasions and
on the night of Glennon's death. On the evening of February
27, the defendant and Glennon had gone to a movie and then
returned to defendant's rooming house. They had intercourse
and when they were finished the defendant asked Glennon if she
meant anything to him. He said, "No." She told him in that
event she had better go east. He handed her a revolver and
told her that this would be a better way. She took the gun and
pointed it at her head. A struggle ensued. During this struggle
the defendant got possession of the gun and shot the deceased
twice.
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After the shooting the police took the defendant, Stokes,
into custody. There she made a confession that she had shot
Glennon. The police advised her to make the confession as that
would help her as the police in Chicago would do all they could
to help her if she gave them evidence.
The police also searched the defendant's room without obtaining a warrant, without consent of defendant and during her
absence from the place. A brush, the type used to- clean revolvers was found there, also a piece of paper with notations
pertaining to the operation of a revolver.
The court held there was error in admitting into evidence
the property found in defendant's room. The court likewise
found that there was error in admitting into evidence the defendant's confession over the objection of defendant's attorney,
as the confession was not voluntary. However as the defendant
had given her testimony voluntarily in court and it had become
part of the record, the errors assigned could not reasonably have
affected the verdict and there would be no good purpose in reversing the judgment. Judgment.affirmed.
John P. Berscheid.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Defendant's statement that
he had liquor held sufficient to justify search of automobile without warrant and use of information discovered thereby in evidence.
Defendant, while driving his automobile on a public highway in the county of St. Joseph, Michigan, was stopped by a
state police officer, who had observed that there Was no license
plate on the front of the automobile and that the rear plate was
not readily discernible; after some conversation with the officer,
defendant admitted that he had liquor in the car and expressed
a desire to "fix it up." The officer searched the car, found the
liquor, and placed the defendant under arrest; the liquor thus obtained uas used as evidence against him and conviction resulted.
People v. Goss, 224 N. W. 364, Supreme Court of Michigan, 1929.
It was the contention of defendant that the search and seizure was unreasonable and unlawful in that no offense was being
committed in the presence of the officer at the time of the arrest,
and that the evidence so obtained should therefore have been
suppressed, a motion to this effect having being denied. The
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court, however, affirmed the ruling of the lower court in denying the motion, saying that the fact that intoxicating liquor -was
found in the car showed that an offense was being committed in
the officer's presence. That fact alone would not justify a search
and seizure; in order that it be justified, it was 'necessary that
the officer act upopn some fact or circumstance or upon such
information as would create in his mind a reasonable and honest
belief that the law was being violated. In this case the information, coming from the defendant himself before the search was
made, was sufficient to justify the search and the subsequent
arrest of defendant, and there was no error in the refusal of the
court to suppress the evidence thus obtained.
J. J. Canty.
MASTER AND SERVANT-Mental disability, the effect
of injuxy in employment, is compensable.
Petitioner in Renolds Case, 145 Atlantic 455, a man of 60
years, was employed as carpenter, and while installing forms.
fell, injuring his left shoulder. He received compensation until
the 2nd day of the following'June, when he signed a settlement
receipt, with the Insurance carrier, which was duly approved
by the Industrial Accident Commission.
Two weeks later he
petitioned for further compensation on account of the same injury, and the Commission ordered compensation for temporary
total incapacity from June 2, 1928 to October 10, 1928; any
further compensation, total 'or partial to result from employee's
further compensation, total or partial to result from employees
own demonstration of his capacity. This was an appeal from
the decree sustaining the Industrial Commission's finding. It
appears that due to a fracture of the ulna, the left arm of the petitioner was in an abnormal condition and a cerebral abnormality
had been affecting him for ten years. However the record proves
that the petitioner suffered both physically and mentally from the
accident.
Supreme Judicial Court of IMaine held that mental disability,
if a sequence as the effect of injury to a great nerve center, received in the course of his employment and arising out of it, is
compensable. Further that citations of authorities are not necessary; that from complete paralysis, or coma, down through the
grades of disability that lessen an operative's capacity to do w.ork
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of his employment, mental inefficiency is to be considered in appraising the economic value of man. "Worry" is-the term used
by the commissioner to express the mental abnormality .which
ensued after the accident. He found it was either caused by the
injury, or that a pre-existing state of mental abnormality or subnormality was excited and caused to flame up with overpowering
vigor by the injury.
J. J. Lyons.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Not liable for tort in
operating golf links in public city park.
This is an actibn against the city and the members of the
park and recreation board of the city for the negligent shooting
of the plaintiff's intestate by, the caddy master on the public golf
links of the city. The caddy master was alleged to be the servant, agent, or employee of the defendants in the operation of
the golf links in a public city park. The liability of the city in
such a case depends on whether the city was then engaged in
a corporate function, or a public and governmental function,
the court holding that it is liable when engaged in a corporate
function and not liable when engaged in a public and governmental function. The court said, "It may be conceded that the
question is judicial and not legislative in its nature, and: that
the Legislature cannot by a declaration make a public governmental function out of one which is inherently merely corporate
in its nature. In this case because the function is delegated to
the city to promote public health and comfort to the public as a
whole, it is governmental and the city is not liable." The court
pointed out that there is a conflict in the decisions in other jurisdictions. Wiliiams v. City of Birmingianz, et al, 121 So. 14. Supreme Court of Alabama, March 21, 1929.
R. C. KuehL.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-City is not liable, where
there has been no material use of property purchased, and no
one having authority has taken part in the matter.
Plaintiffs, residents and taxpayers of the city of Owatonna
brought suit against individual members of city council and the
city officers to enjoin them from accepting a certain truck and
from issuing any order, warrant or check in papyment thereof by
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said city, without proper authority so to do. The city charter
provided that all contracts be approved by the mayor and signed
by him and that they should be void unless so signed and attested by city clerk after same had been ordered by resolution
of a majority of the city council. At a meeting of the council,
the chairman, being authorized by a -zote of the council, appointed a committee of three to purchase a truck for the street
department, they to have full power to act in the matter. One
Pavek, as chairman of the committee, signed order for truck and
obtained same from General Motors Truck Company. It was
brought to city, a sign painted on it and was used for two days
by the street department. A restraining order was issued and
the use of the truck ceased. Upon its being shown that the mayor
had never signed order, an injunction was granted and an appeal
was taken. Wiliiams, et al z. Klemmer, et al, (Minn.) 224 N. W.
261.
The court stated that the question of the liability of the
city on quantum meruit or otherwise was. not involved, the sole
question being the authority of the defendants, as officers of the
city, to accept for the city, or issue warrants for the city- in
payment for this truck. No valid acceptance by the city was
shown and the limited use made of the truck by the street department and the painting of the sign on the truck, were not
sufficient. Tracy, Cement Tile Co. v. City of Tracy, 143 (Minn.)
415.
The contract for the truck involved the expenditure of a
considerable sum and the city officials, as well as those seeking
to deal with the city, are bound to take notice of and comply
with the. charter provisions. The council could not delegate
the power to make a contract. Jewel Belting Co. v. Village of
Bertha, 91 (Minn.) 9.
The right to an injunction appears sufficiently clear. The
injury is irreparable where threatened acts complained of would
result in the unauthorized or unlawful expenditure of a substantial sum of money out of funds of the city raised by taxation
and no there prompt remedy is provided. Equity will enjoin unauthorized acts of city officials, where such acts will result in
unauthorized or unlawful expenditure or diversion of public
funds. Where, as here, prompt objection is made by tax payers
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before there has been any material use of the property,and no
action has been taken in reference thereto except by one or two
officials who had no authority to bind the city, the rule that
where the city receives property, consumes it or cannot restore
it, the city will be held liable, does not apply.
D. M. Donahue.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS-This was a petition to dismiss an appeal of the plaintiff from an award of the
Public Service Commission for damages caused by the abolition
of a grade crossing. Howe et al v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 1929,
14 A. 282.
Thirteen property owners, alleging that they had been or
would be injured by the making of the improvement, applied to
the Commission to assess the amount of their damages, as provided by the Public Service Law of July, 1913. The Commission decided that none of the claimants had been or would be
damaged and dismissed all claims. They separately appealed
to the court of common pleas, where the present appellant filed
a petition, in each case, praying a dismissal of the appeal for
want of jurisdiction in that court.
The Supreme Court held that an appeal from Public Service
Commissions to the Common Pleas is permissable only wheredamages are awarded and there is a right to jury trial.
The case nearest in point is Donnelly v. Public Service Commnission, 26S Pa. 345, 112 A. 160., where the appeal was taken to
the court of Common Pleas. There, however, the Commission
liad made an award, and the property damage had a constitutional right to a trial by jury.
M. E., McGcogehgan.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-Immunity from unreasonable search is personal to the owner of the premises and may
be waived.
From a conviction on a charge of violating the liquor law
the defendant appeals. Millar v. State, (Ind. App.) 166 N. E. 554.
It appears that warrant was duly issued to proper officers for the
search of the premises of one Andy N. Miller. The search was
made and three hundred and twenty-three pint bottles of "home
brew beer" and two capping machines were found on the prem-
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ises. These were confiscated and Andy N. Miller arrested. The
appellant, Walter Miller, it appears, followed the officers to the
police station, claiming the articles- seized under the warrant
to be his. Upon this assertion of ownership he was immediately
placed under arrest, and upon trial in the city court of Muncie,
Indiana, was found guilty and appealed'to the Circuit Court.
In the latter court he field a motion to suppress all evidence, which motion was overruled. This court held that motion was properly overruled; since appellant was a stranger to
the search, warrant proceedings, and not the owner of the premises searched, he could not avail himself of the privilege personal
to the owner of the premises alone, and a privilege which may
be waived. Tungat v. State, 197 Ind. 539, 151 N. E. 427.
G. L. Housley.
WATER RIGHTS-In re water rights of Utah Construction Co. District Court (Federal) of Idaho, January 12, 1929..
The Utah Construction Co., incorporated in Utah and a
resident thereof, instituted proceedings before the Commissioner of reclamation of the State of Idaho, under provisions of
compiled Ida. Stat. for the purpose of securing permission to
change the point of diversion and place the use, of the waters
of Big Lost River.
Protestants appeared at the hearing and alleged they were
all citizens and residents of the State of Idaho, and objected to
the proposed transfer.
Commissioners found for the Utah Construction Co. by
granting requested, permission.
Protestants upon appeal to the district court, as provided
by statute (see 5382 Ida. Com. stat.) gave notice of appeal to
the Dept. of Reclamation and the Utah Construction, and later
served notice on the Dept. of Reclamation, but failed to serve
notice on the respondent Utah Construction Co.
Respondent thereupon asked removal of cause of action to
the Federal Court. Request granted.
Questions on appeal were: (1) Is the Commissioner of
the State of Idaho, who is a resident thereof and, a citizen, a
necessary and indispensable party to the controversy so as
to prevent the removal on the grounds of diversity of citizenship? (2) Who is the real party in interest, the Utah. Const.
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Co? Who claims a water right of the nine resident protestants
who appealed?
Protestants' apparent contention, that, the purported water
right sought to be transferred is subject to the protestants, as the
same having been abandoned for more than five years prior to
the filing of the application for transfer by Utah Construction
Co., and that as a result the respondent had no water right t6
transfer.
The Court in finding for the respondent Utah Construction
Co., said: Where an appeal to a Court of equity of Common Law
jurisdiction (italics mine)- from an order of such administrative
officer is provided, it then becomes a suit, if made to a Court or
tribunal having power to determine questions of law and fact,
either with or without a jury. Upshur Conty 'v. Rich, 135 U. S.
467, 10 S. Ct. 651. 34 L. Ed. 196.
The State is not through its administritive officer ,the commissioner of reclamation, making any contest as to the right of
the Company to transfer the right, of use of its wateir right or
whether the Company had a water right at all. Then, if the
respondent is directly interested in the subject matter of the
controversy it is entitled to notice of all steps taken in the
proceedings, whether it be provided for in the statute or not.
The jurisdiction of a Circuit Court of the United States
depends upon the acts passed by Congress and can not be enlarged or abridged by any statute of a state. The legislature or
the judiciary of a state can neither defeat the right given by a
Constitutional act of Congress to remove a case nor limit the
effect of such removal. Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S.,
518. Courtney v. Pradits, 196, U. S., 89. Central Union Fire
Ins. v. Kelley 282 F. 772.
The citizenship, or resident of the real, as distinguished from
the nominal parties, governs the matter or removal. Salem
Trust Co. v. Man. Finance Co., 264, U. S. 182.
Their being no requirement of the statute or rule of Court
undre consideration for the Utah Const. Co. to answer and plead
in the proceedings in the State Court, the steps of removal taken
in this cause would seem to have been taken properly, and entitles the respondent to have the cause removed to this court.

574'
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Motion denied to protestants.
Thomas J. Jones,-Jr.
WILLS-In the case of Moss et al v. Axfor et al, reported
in 224 N. W. 425, the Supreme Court of Michigan held- that
a devise of property to A, with instruction to pay it to person
who had" given testatrix best care in declining -years, was -not
personal, but, if valid, created trust; language being mandatory
in effect.
The action was brought to construe the fifteenth paragraph
of the will of Caroline M. Girard, made when she was about 77
yea-rs of age.
The paragraph read:-"I give, devise and bequeath all the
rest, residue and remainder of my property to Henry W. Axford
with the instruction to pay the same to the person vho has given
me the best of care in my declining years and who in his opinion is the nrost worthy of my said property. I make him the
sole judge and request that his signature with the signature of
the person receiving said property shall be sufficient release for
my said executor."
The plaintiffs are sisters of Mrs. Girard and claim as her
heirs. Defendant Mary Piers took care of the testatrix from the
time the will was made until her death, and was designated by
Mr. Axford as the person entitled to the residue of the estate
under the above clause.
The plaintiffs contended that the clause was an invalid attempt to create an express trust, because there was no beneficiary
fully expressd and clearly defined upon the face of the will, as
required by statute.
The court said in its opinion while the words used in the
residuary clause are precatory, the intent of the testatrix in the
in the disposition of the residue of her property to the person
who should care for her is manifest, and the language is mandatory in effect. 145 Mich. 257; 68 N.H. 241; 73 Am. St. Rep.
581. The devise of the residue to'Mr. Axford was not personal.
but, if valid, created a trust in him. 58 Mich. 494; 25 N. W. 481.
The purpose of Mrs. Girard was lawful and should be carried
out, "unless. there is such uncertainty that the law is fairly
baffled." 41 Mich. 7. It is not necessary that a beneficiary be
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designated by name, or by a description which makes indentification automatic. 40 Cyc. 1446. Nor that the testator have in
mind the particular person upon whom his bounty may fall.
137 Va. 502; 120 S. E. 261; 38 A. L. R. 767.
It is enough if the testator .uses language which is sufficiently clear to enable the court by extrinsic evidence to identify
the beneficiary. If by such evidence the court can make theidentification necessary to give effect to the invention of the tesiator,
the devise will be sustained. 155 Mich. 126, 118 N. W. 938;
138 Mich. 157; 101 N. WV. 217.
A trust is not invalidated by the fact that the trustee is
vested with discretion. 39 Cyc. 316. In Lear vs. Manser, 114
Me. 342, 96 A. 240, a case closely in point, the residue of the
estate was given to the executor in trust, "to be paid by him to
such person or persons, or to such institution as shall care for me
in my last sickness, such sickness, such payment to be made to
the person or persons, or intitution, or any or all of them as may
in the discretion of any executor be equitably entitled thereto,
and the payment by my said executor and receipt taken by him
therefor shall be a sufficient voucher and discharge to him under
the provisions of this item."
The court held the identification of the beneficiary suifficient, as the testator had "prescribed a rule whereby his beneficiary could be identified with certainty. The court also
pointed out that, although the trustee was invested with discretion, the trust would not perish with him, but "it -could be
executed by another trustee appointed by the court if necessary,
for the duty imposed upon the trustee, and the discretion given
to him in the exercise of that duty, are imperative and not optional, they were intended by the testator to be executed at all
events."
In the case at bar the will provided no restriction on alienation. The beneficiary, whoever it might be, was in being, and
she and the trustee could have conveyed an absolute fee at any
time. Moreover, the ordinary delays in the settlement of an
estate are not within the reason of the statute. 123 Mich. 281,
82 N. W. 56. Judgment of the lower court affirmed.
F. Earl Lambole,.

